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Preface 
ince the ILO’s International Labour Conference adopted the Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up in 1998, much progress 
has been made toward achieving respect for, and promotion and realization of, its 
four principals: freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child 
labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect to employment and occupation. 
In particular, the ILO’s two Conventions on Forced Labour have today received almost 
universally ratification, and enjoy wide recognition and support. 
Shortly after the adoption of the 1998 Declaration, the ILO Governing Body established 
the Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL), which is located in 
the Fundamental Principles and Rights Branch of the Governance and Tripartism 
Department. Since its establishment in 2001, SAP-FL has prioritized research and statistics 
to enhance the global understanding of forced labour and related practices, such as 
human trafficking and slavery, to support the development of evidence-based policies 
and programmes to address forced labour, human trafficking and other forms of 
involuntary, coercive work.  
The publication by the ILO of new estimates on forced labour in 2012 created a sense of 
urgency on the need to address implementation gaps regarding the ILO’s Forced 
Labour Conventions. In addition, it also prompted calls to consider the adoption of 
supplementary standards by the 103rd International Labour Conference in June 2014.  
The power of normative pressure against those who still use or condone the use of 
forced labour is essential. National legislation needs to be strengthened to combat 
forced labour and penalties against those who profit from it need to be strictly enforced. 
However, a better understanding of the socio-economic root causes as well as a new 
assessment of the profits of forced labour are equally important to bringing about long-
term change.  
The purpose of this report is to do just that. It highlights how forced labour thrives in the 
incubator of poverty and vulnerability, low levels of education and literacy, migration 
and other factors. The evidence and results presented in this report illustrate the need for 
stronger measures of prevention and protection and for enhanced law enforcement as 
the basic responses to forced labour. At the same time, it also provides new knowledge 
of the determinants of forced labour that can help us develop and expand policies and 
programmes to not only stop forced labour where it exists, but prevent it before it occurs.  
The report is based on the efforts of a multi-disciplinary research team, led by SAP-FL and 
supported by the ILO’s Research Department, ILO experts and external peer reviewers. 
The publication of this report was possible thanks to the generous contributions of the 
Government of Ireland (Irish Aid) that provides core funding to SAP-FL. The U.S. 
S
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Department of Labor and UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
provided funding for the implementation of surveys.  
It is hoped that this new report will contribute to greater awareness and effective action 
against forced labour as well as further research in this area.  
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Introduction 
he global integration of economies, including labour markets, has brought many 
opportunities for workers and businesses. Despite the past years of economic crisis, it 
has generally spurred economic growth. However, the growth in the global 
economy has not been beneficial for all. Today, about 21 million men, women and 
children are in forced labour, trafficked, held in debt bondage or work in slave-like 
conditions.  
The publication of this new ILO report on the economics of forced labour takes the 
understanding of forced labour, human trafficking, and modern forms of slavery to a 
new level. It builds on earlier ILO studies on the extent, cost and profits from forced 
labour. For the first time, it looks at both the supply and demand sides of forced labour, 
and presents solid evidence for a correlation between forced labour and poverty. 
What’s more, it provides startling new estimates of the illegal profits generated through 
the use of forced labour, as well as new evidence of the key socio-economic factors 
that increase the risk of falling victim to coercion and abuse.  
These new findings come as progress is being made in the struggle against forced 
labour. State-imposed forced labour is declining in importance when compared to the 
extent of forced labour in the private economy. Of course, vigilance is needed to 
prevent state-imposed forced labour from resurging. But attention must now be focused 
on understanding what continues to drive forced labour and trafficking in the private 
sector.  
Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for an understanding of forced labour and what it is, and 
examines the importance of defining forced labour and related practices, such as 
human trafficking and slavery. It reviews the global forced labour estimates published by 
the ILO in 2012, which were significantly higher than the ILO’s earlier estimate.  
Chapter 2 examines the profits from forced labour. Using a new and expanded 
methodology and based on the 2012 Global Estimate, the report provides updated 
estimates of the global profits generated by forced labour. 
Chapter 3 provides a new analysis of the socio-economic factors that make people 
vulnerable to forced labour. Based on a series of ground-breaking country surveys that 
consider a range of different cohorts and factors, it highlights where forced labour is 
most likely to occur and provides a striking correlation between household vulnerability 
to sudden income shocks and the likelihood of ending up in forced labour. It also 
elucidates risk factors that can increase vulnerability to forced labour, such as poverty, 
lack of education, illiteracy, gender and migration.  
The results of this study serve to highlight the critical need for standardized data 
collection methods across countries that enable the ILO and other international 
organisations to generate more reliable global figures, measure trends and better 
understand risk factors. What’s more, it also shows how understanding the socio-
T
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economic factors that increase a person’s vulnerability to forced labour can help drive 
the development of new, more robust and concrete strategies that augment existing 
programmes. In addition, it calls for a strengthening of laws and policies based on 
normative responses and an expansion of preventive measures that can keep people 
out of forced labour. 
The report concludes that there is an urgent need to address the socio-economic root 
causes of this hugely profitable illegal practice if it is to be overcome. Comprehensive 
measures are required that involve governments, workers, employers and other 
stakeholders working together to end forced labour. It shows how the continued 
existence of forced labour is not only bad for its victims, it’s bad for business and 
development as well. And it aptly illustrates that forced labour is a practice that has no 
place in modern society and should be eradicated as a matter of priority. 
  
3 
 
Chapter 1 
Measuring forced labour, human trafficking and 
slavery: Why definitions matter 
lear and precise definitions are fundamental to the measurement of social 
problems, their trends and potential change. By carefully defining a problem, it is 
possible to quantify its extent, understand whether it decreases or increases over 
time, and assess whether policies have an impact. Some problems are easier to 
measure than others, and the consensus is that measuring forced labour, trafficking, 
slavery, including sexual exploitation, poses many challenges. The hidden nature of the 
problem, political sensitivities and ethical considerations make it very difficult to 
implement verifiable surveys.  
This chapter examines the definition of forced labour, and how it may affect estimates of 
its extent and the profits generated through exploitation and loss of freedom. It also 
considers the phrase “modern slavery”, which has emerged as a catch-all for forced 
labour, human trafficking, forced sexual exploitation and some of the worst forms of 
child labour. There has been some concern, in both academic and legal circles, that 
the phrase represents a trend to label certain practices as more extreme than is legally 
accurate. There is no question that slavery, in all its forms, is unacceptable and must be 
eradicated. However, not all children exposed to hazardous work are “slaves”, and not 
all labour that is not compensated with a fair wage is necessarily forced.  
The ILO’s Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) defines forced labour as: “All work or 
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for 
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily'' (ILO C.29, Art. 1). Convention 
No. 29 provides for certain exceptions with respect to work of a purely military character, 
“normal” civic obligations, work as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law and 
carried out under the control of a public authority, work in emergency situations such as 
wars or natural calamities, and minor communal services (Art. 2.2). A subsequent ILO 
Convention, the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) further specifies 
that forced labour can never be used as a means of political coercion or education or 
as punishment for expressing political views or for participating in strike action, as labour 
discipline, as racial, social, national or religious discrimination, or for mobilizing labour for 
economic development purposes.  
Forced labour includes practices such as slavery and those similar to slavery, debt 
bondage and serfdom as defined in other international instruments, such as the League 
of Nations Slavery Convention (1926)1 and the UN Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
                                                   
1
 The 1926 Slavery Convention defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of 
the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised” (Article 1(1)). 
C
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(1956). Further, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) has provided guidance on the scope of the definition of 
forced labour, stressing that it encompasses trafficking in persons for the purpose of 
labour and sexual exploitation,2 as defined by the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children.3 
The Palermo Protocol defines trafficking in persons as the recruitment, transportation, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of coercion, abduction, deception or abuse 
of power or of vulnerability, for the purpose of exploitation. It goes on to specify that 
exploitation, at a minimum, includes sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery and 
slavery-like practices.4 There is therefore a clear link between the Protocol and ILO 
Convention No. 29. The only type of exploitation specified in the Protocol’s definitional 
article that is not also covered by ILO Convention No. 29 is trafficking for the removal of 
organs. 
Forced labour affects both adults and children as defined in Convention No. 29. 
However, the importance of definitions is illustrated in the terms of the ILO Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)5. The Convention makes a distinction between 
children who are held in slavery, debt bondage or serfdom, or who are trafficked or 
subjected to forced labour, and those who are in “hazardous work”. All of these forms of 
child labour should be eliminated within the shortest possible time but different 
approaches are required. The Convention is part of a larger canon of UN and ILO 
instruments in which the drafters agreed that children cannot voluntarily “consent” to 
exploitation and that free movement does not equal free labour.  
For the purposes of this report, therefore, all primary data have been validated as 
applying to persons meeting the definition under Convention No. 29: men and women, 
boys and girls were considered as being in forced labour whenever the work was 
involuntary as a result of force, fraud or deception, and a penalty or threat of a penalty 
was used to coerce them or their parents in the case of children below the age of 18. 
This means that, for example, working for low wages is not considered forced labour 
                                                   
2
 ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR): Eradication of 
forced labour: General survey concerning the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) (Geneva, 2007), Report III (Part 1B), para. 77. 
3
 The Protocol supplements the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000). It criminalizes 
trafficking in persons, whether it occurs within countries or across borders, and whether or not conducted by 
organized criminal networks. 
4
 Article 3 of the Protocol defines trafficking as: “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs.” (Art. 3 (a)). It also specifies that: “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ’trafficking in persons‘ even if this does 
not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article” (Art. 3 (c)).  
5
 According to the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182), “worst forms of child labour” shall 
include “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt 
bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of 
children for use in armed conflict”. 
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unless it results from coercion applied by the employer or recruiter. Victims of forced 
labour could be working in their place of origin, in another part of their country, or 
abroad.  
A simple typology 
Since 2005, the ILO has classified forced labour in three main categories: 
 
• Forced labour imposed by the state covers all forms of work exacted by public 
authorities, military or paramilitary, compulsory participation in public works and 
forced prison labour (within the scope of ILO Conventions No. 29 and No. 105);  
• Forced labour imposed by private agents for sexual exploitation covers any 
commercial sexual activity, including pornography, exacted from the victim by 
fraud or force; and, 
• Forced labour imposed by private agents for labour exploitation includes bonded 
labour, forced domestic work, forced labour of migrants in many economic sectors 
and work imposed in the context of slavery or vestiges of slavery. Forced illicit 
activities such as forced begging for gangs for example are also included in this 
category. 
 
The ILO’s 2012 Global Estimate of forced labour covers these three forms of forced 
labour, but the estimate of the profits and the analysis of the causes of forced labour 
presented in this paper are limited to labour and sexual exploitation extracted by private 
agents. 
Measuring forced labour: A brief history 
In early 2000, there was virtually no solid data on forced labour, either at the national or 
global levels. Some international organizations, governments, media and non-
governmental organizations cited anecdotal evidence of forced labour, but most of the 
information was vague, imprecise in its terminology and analysis, or quantified by widely 
varying estimates, if at all. In response, the ILO undertook the difficult task of collecting 
data that could be verified, thus providing a foundation to inform policy and action 
against forced labour. 
The ILO designed and implemented qualitative research worldwide on the mechanisms 
of recruitment, working conditions and the means of coercion imposed on child and 
adult workers in various sectors and industries. At the same time, data were gathered by 
various organizations and governments on identified and assisted victims of forced 
labour and human trafficking, which began to raise concerns of what was perceived as 
“the tip of the iceberg” of a much larger phenomenon. Compounding the difficulty, it 
emerged that most victims who managed to escape from forced labour or trafficking 
returned to their place of origin without asking for assistance, and therefore were not 
included in those databases. 
In 2005, the ILO published the first global estimate of forced labour, with indications of its 
regional distribution and broad forms in the Director-General’s Global Report entitled A 
global alliance against forced labour. The global estimate’s methodology was 
experimental and could, doubtless, have been improved in many ways. However, this 
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first estimate had the effect of launching an entirely new global discussion on the issue, 
not only on the extent of the problem that had been largely invisible due to weak or 
non-existent reliable data, but also on how to mobilize public awareness of its continued 
existence and develop means to support its elimination.6 
Subsequently, data collection was extended to the national level and selected sectoral 
and geographical areas of potential forced labour. Between 2007 and 2012, the ILO 
launched a number of pilot statistical surveys in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe. 
In most cases, these surveys were designed and implemented in collaboration with 
National Statistical Offices to guarantee the quality of the work and to ensure national 
ownership.  
The first surveys on the forced labour of migrant workers were conducted in Armenia, 
Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, all origin countries for mainly adult labour 
migrants and therefore potential sources of trafficking. The three surveys were 
implemented as household-based surveys, targeting labour migrants who returned from 
abroad after an absence of two to three years. In two other countries, Nepal and the 
Niger, surveys targeted households at risk of more traditional forms of forced labour of 
adults and children. Finally, surveys to estimate different forms of forced labour and 
trafficking, either at the national or regional levels or for a given sector of activity, were 
implemented in five countries: Bangladesh, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guatemala and Mali.  
These surveys gathered data on the socio-economic profile of the respondents, the 
recruitment process, migration history (if relevant), working and living conditions 
including the risk of involuntariness and penalty, economic data on wages, recruitment 
fees and remittances, and whether the workers had requested assistance. These data 
were used for the 2012 Global Estimate (to estimate the ratio of reported/non-reported 
cases of forced labour) and for the determinants analysis (testing some characteristics of 
the households or respondents for the regression analysis).  
The lessons learned by implementing those pilot surveys were published in 2012 in 
another ILO publication, entitled Hard to see, harder to count: Survey guidelines to 
estimate forced labour of adults and children.7 The guidelines included an operational 
definition of forced labour, along with a list of criteria for assessing forced labour that are 
now being used in the validation process of any ILO data used for research on forced 
labour to ensure consistency. 
 
                                                   
6
 ILO: A global alliance against forced labour, Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Geneva, 2005); P. Belser et al.: ILO Minimum Estimate of Forced 
Labour in the World (ILO, Geneva, 2005). 
7
 ILO: Hard to see, harder to count: Survey guidelines to estimate forced labour of children and adults (Geneva 
2012), available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_182096.pdf. 
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The ILO 2012 Global Estimate of forced labour 
In the 2012 survey, the ILO estimated that 20.9 million people are in forced labour 
globally, trafficked for labour and sexual exploitation or held in slavery-like conditions. 
The vast majority of the 20.9 million forced labourers − 18.7 million (90 per cent) − are 
exploited in the private economy, by individuals or enterprises. Of these, 4.5 million (22 
per cent) are victims of forced sexual exploitation, and 14.2 million (68 per cent) are 
victims of forced labour exploitation, primarily in agriculture, construction, domestic 
work, manufacturing, mining and utilities. The remaining 2.2 million (10 per cent) are in 
state-imposed forms of forced labour, such as prisons, or in work imposed by military or 
paramilitary forces. 
 
Figure 1: Global estimate by form of forced labour 
 
Source: ILO 
 
Women and girls represent the greater share of the total – 11.4 million (55 per cent) – 
compared to 9.5 million (45 per cent) men and boys. Adults are more affected than 
children – 15.4 million (74 per cent) are aged 18 or older, with the number of children 
under the age of 18 estimated at 5.5 million (26 per cent). 
The Asia-Pacific region accounts by far for the largest number of forced labourers – 11.7 
million (56 per cent of the global total). The second highest number is found in Africa at 
3.7 million (18 per cent), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean with 1.8 million 
victims (9 per cent). The Developed Economies and European Union account for 1.5 
million (7 per cent), while countries of Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe (CSEE) 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have 1.6 million (7 per cent). There 
are an estimated 600,000 (3 per cent) victims in the Middle East.8  
                                                   
8
 Regional groupings are based on those used in the ILO’s report, Global Employment Trends 2012 (Geneva). 
Percentages and numbers are rounded. 
Sexual exploitation
4,500,000.00 
22%
Labour 
exploitation
14,200,000.00 
68%
State imposed 
2,200,000.00  
10%
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The prevalence rate (number of victims per thousand inhabitants) is highest in the CSEE 
and Africa regions at 4.2 and 4.0, respectively, and lowest in the Developed Economies 
at 1.5 per 1,000 inhabitants. The relatively high prevalence in CSEE and CIS can be 
attributed to the fact that the population is much lower than in Asia, while reports of 
trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation and of state-imposed forced labour in the 
region are numerous. 
The estimates also provide a picture of the impact of migration on forced labour. Of the 
total, an estimated 9.1 million people (44 per cent) moved either internally or 
internationally, while the majority, 11.8 million (56 per cent), were subjected to forced 
labour within their place of origin or residence. The study also showed that cross-border 
movement is strongly associated with forced sexual exploitation, while a majority of 
victims of forced labour exploitation, and almost all those in state-imposed forced 
labour, have not left their home areas. Another interesting result to emerge from the 
estimates is that victims spend an average of 18 months in forced labour, although this 
varied with different forms of forced labour. 
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Chapter 2 
Estimating the profits of forced labour 
he exaction of forced labour often involves a range of intermediaries such as 
brokers, moneylenders or criminal networks. They all take advantage of workers who 
are vulnerable to deception, abuse and fraud. But the individuals and enterprises 
that employ workers under conditions of forced labour stand to gain the most by 
underpaying their workers, or by not paying them at all. The ILO Global Estimate of 
Forced Labour in 2012 also provided evidence on the length of time that victims of 
forced labour were held captive. In more than one third of the reported cases that 
contained such information, forced labour lasted one to two years. Almost half of 
reported cases indicated that victims spent six months or less in forced labour.9 During 
this time, unscrupulous employers and criminals can make significant profits by exacting 
forced labour.  
In 2005, the ILO published its first estimate of the profits resulting from human trafficking, 
which was considered as a process involving the movement of a person by a third 
party.10 The total illicit profits produced in 1 year by trafficked forced labourers were 
estimated at US$32 billion. The methodology was explained in more detail and extended 
to non-trafficked forced labour in an ILO working paper published in 2005.11 
The paper provided the first estimates of the profits made by the use of forced labour, 
using data on value added in the agricultural sector. Estimates were also given for 
forced sexual exploitation. The results were based on the estimates of the extent of 
forced labour published by the ILO in 2005.12 The focus was on the agricultural sector, as 
it was assumed to employ a high number of forced labour victims. Profits were defined in 
the 2005 working paper as the difference between the average economic value added 
and the sum of expenditures on wage payments and intermediate consumption. It was 
estimated that the global profits made using forced labour were at least US$44 billion 
per year, including the US$32 billion from trafficking. 
In 2009, the ILO Global Report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work focused on the financial costs workers 
incurred as a result of being held in forced labour. The report concentrated on the 
underpayment of wages and the costs involved in the recruitment process, such as 
                                                   
9
 ILO: ILO global estimate of forced labour: Results and methodology (Geneva, 2012). 
10
 ILO: A global alliance against forced labour, Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Geneva, 2005). 
11
 P. Belser: Forced Labour and Human Trafficking: Estimating the Profits (Geneva, ILO, Special Action 
Programme to Combat Forced Labour, 2005), DECLARATION/WP/42/2005. 
12
 ILO: A global alliance against forced labour, Global Report under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Geneva, 2005); P. Belser et al.: ILO Minimum Estimate of Forced 
Labour in the World (ILO, Geneva, 2005). 
T
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recruitment fees. The report found that, excluding forced sexual exploitation, the total 
costs of coercion were approximately US$21 billion, with the total amount of underpaid 
wages estimated to be US$19.6 billion, with the remaining US$1.4 billion attributed to 
illegal recruitment fees. 
This report re-estimates the illegal profits made from the use of forced labour based on 
an updated methodology and data collected for the 2012 Global Estimate. Like the 
2005 ILO estimate of the profits of forced labour, this new estimate does not take into 
account profits generated by forced labour imposed by state authorities. The new 
estimate is the aggregation of regional profit figures for three forms of forced labour, 
namely forced labour exploitation outside domestic work, forced domestic work and 
forced sexual exploitation. 
Previous estimates 
The 2005 estimate of the profits made by the use of forced labour exploitation relied on 
the value added for the agricultural sector. This was considered a good indicator of the 
average value added in the different low-skilled activities performed by forced labour 
victims. In addition, a high number of forced labour victims were considered to be 
working in this sector. The methodology involved the calculation of profits as the total 
value added  (VA) minus the total wage payments (W). When information on value 
added was not readily available, the turnover approach was used, where the profits 
were estimated to be the turnover (T) less total wage payments (W) less intermediate 
consumption (C). Turnover was calculated as the average value of goods and services 
produced per worker multiplied by the total number of workers.13  Thus, to estimate the 
profits, the 2005 paper used the following equations: 
π = VA – W 
 =  − (+C) 
 = (	
 − ( + 
 
 
Information on the added value per person in agriculture from the 2004 World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank14 and the hypothesis that, on average, 
forced labour victims are paid about 20 per cent of their added value resulted in an 
estimated illegal profit of US$10.4 billion. A high percentage of the profits were made in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (US$3.6 billion), Developed Economies (US$3.4 billion) 
and in Asia and the Pacific (US$2.5 billion). When only trafficked individuals were 
considered, the 2005 paper estimated a profit of about US$3.8 billion. 
Estimating the illegal profit from forced sexual exploitation is difficult as information on 
the economic added value of sex work is scarce and an “inappropriate” measure. 
Rough estimates are therefore used where the prices paid by clients were estimated 
                                                   
13
 This is in itself calculated as the average price of units produced (p) multiplied by the quantity (q) produced 
per worker. 
14
 The World Bank: World Development Indicators (Washington D.C., 2004). 
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based on the level of income of the country where the transaction took place and the 
legal regime of that country. Based on information from multiple sources, it was 
estimated that each individual subjected to forced sexual exploitation had 80 
transactions per month. It was further estimated that wage payments and intermediate 
consumption was about 30 per cent of total turnover. Using this information, it was 
estimated that profits made from forced sexual exploitation were about US$33.9 billion, 
with profits made from forced sexual exploitation as a result of trafficking estimated to 
be about US$27.8 billion, where almost half of these profits were made in industrialized 
economies alone (US$13.3 billion).  
In his 2009 study, Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery15, Siddharth Kara 
estimates there were 28.4 million slaves worldwide at the end of 2006. Using a profit and 
loss statement approach, the implied annual revenues generated by slaves at the end 
of 2006 was about US$152.3 billion, with the implied annual profit from slave labour 
estimated to be US$91.2 billion. This figure was revised in 2012 to reach US$96.5 billion. To 
calculate the profits, Kara initially calculates the revenue generated by each slave. For 
each type of slavery, Kara estimates a percentage in each region. Thus, for bonded 
labour and debt bondage, he estimates that 89 per cent are in South Asia, 5.5 per cent 
in Latin America and the other 5.5 per cent in Africa. He then divides, for each type of 
slavery in each region, the percentage of slaves in specific industries of selected 
countries. For example, of the 89 per cent of slaves in South Asia, 15 per cent are 
estimated to be in brick kilns, 25 per cent in carpet weaving and other manufacturing, 
and the remaining 60 per cent in rice and sugar cane production. 
For brick kilns, Kara decides to use India as a case study, and thus estimates that the 
annual revenue generated by a bonded labourer working in the brick kilns of India 
amounts to US$4,355. This value, when multiplied by the percentage of bonded 
labourers in the brick kilns, puts the annual revenue contribution of a brick-kiln bonded 
labourer to the total revenues generated by bonded labourers in South Asia at US$653. 
This calculation is also done for the carpet weaving industry in India and the rice and 
sugar cane industry. An average of the revenues generated by these three selected 
industries are then calculated and subsequently multiplied by the percentage of 
bonded labourers in South Asia. 
The calculations are then repeated for Latin America, where the countries used are 
Brazil, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, focusing on the charcoal camps (10 per 
cent), cattle farms (30 per cent) and agriculture (60 per cent), specifically tobacco and 
sugar cane, and for Africa using Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Uganda, where the sectors 
focused on include agriculture (90 per cent), specifically coffee and cocoa, and 
transport/conveyance (10 per cent). The overall revenue generated by bonded 
labourers is calculated as the weighted average of the estimated revenues per selected 
region. Operating costs are calculated using information from data gathered during the 
survey and face-to-face interviews. The final profit generated is estimated to be the 
revenues minus the operating costs. 
                                                   
15
 S. Kara: Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery (New York, Columbia University Press, 2009). 
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Figure 2 Summary of Kara methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  S. Kara: Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery (New York, Columbia University Press, 2009). 
 
Both approaches discussed so far employ a business model. While the ILO 2005 working 
paper chooses to use the value added statement approach, Kara uses the profits and 
loss statement approach. In the next section, the model is developed to estimate the 
profits made by the use of forced labour, using information from the 2012 Global 
Estimate database. The new methodology can be seen as a combination of the two 
methodologies described above. Since the two previous estimates were released, 
several studies have been carried out on the economics of forced labour, with new 
information coming to light. In addition, many cases of forced labour collected by the 
ILO for the 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour contained information on the sectors 
in which victims are concentrated and on the wages that they earn in the various 
sectors. These new data are used to improve the previous models. 
New estimate 
In addition to the victims, the main financial losers from forced labour are the countries 
where forced labour originates or where forced labour occurs. The victims usually lose 
much of their earnings due to wage retention, debt repayments and underpayment of 
wages. They work under strenuous conditions but receive little or no pay. The countries 
where they work lose revenues from non-payment of taxes due to undeclared incomes 
or the illegal nature of the jobs concerned. For the countries of origin, remittances are 
severely affected by the very low wages of forced labourers. For developing countries, 
this cut in remittances tends to result in a heavy reduction in investments and a lack of 
improvement in income inequality.  
Data collected by the ILO for the 2012 Global Estimate of Forced Labour made it 
possible to revise the 2005 estimate of the profits, giving a more accurate picture of the 
financial impact of forced labour by region. All calculations are made using 2006 as a 
reference year. As explained in detail in the following sections, the new estimate is the 
aggregation of regional figures of profits for three forms of forced labour, namely forced 
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labour exploitation outside domestic work, forced domestic work and forced sexual 
exploitation. These forms concern 18.7 million victims out of the 20.9 million people 
estimated to be in forced labour in 2012. In absence of reliable information on the 
economics of state-imposed forced labour, and the theoretical difficulties in estimating 
the profits in forms such as child soldiers, it was decided to exclude the profits generated 
by the 2.2 million victims of state-imposed forced labour. 
 
Table 2.1. Estimated annual profits from forced labour (US$ billion) 
Source: ILO  
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding 
 
It is estimated that the total illegal profits obtained from the use of forced labour16 
worldwide amount to US$150.2 billion per year. More than one third of the profits – 
US$51.2 billion – are made in forced labour exploitation, including nearly US$8 billion 
generated in domestic work by employers who use threats and coercion to pay no or 
low wages.  
The profits are highest in Asia (US$ 51.8 billion) and Developed Economies (US$ 46.9 
billion), mainly for two reasons: the high number of victims in Asia and the high profit per 
victim in Developed Economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                   
16
 Outside state-imposed forced labour. 
Region Forced Sexual 
Exploitation 
Domestic work Non Domestic 
labour 
Total 
Asia-Pacific                       31.70                          6.30                    13.80  51.80 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
                      10.40                          0.50                         1.00  12.00 
Africa                         8.90                          0.30                         3.90  13.10 
Middle East                         7.50                          0.40                         0.60  8.50 
Central and South-
Eastern Europe and 
CIS 
                      14.30                          0.10                         3.60  18.00 
Developed 
Economies and EU 
                      26.20                          0.20                       20.50  46.90 
World                       99.00                          7.90                       43.40  150.20 
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Figure 3. Annual profits of forced labour by region (US$ billion) 
 
Source: ILO 
Annual profit per victim is highest in the Developed Economies (US$34,800 per victim), 
followed by countries in the Middle East (US$15,000 per victim), and lowest in the Asia-
Pacific region (US$5,000 per victim) and in Africa (US$3,900 per victim). 
 
Figure 4. Annual profit per victim of forced labour by region (US$) 
Source: ILO 
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Globally, two thirds of the profits from forced labour were generated by forced sexual 
exploitation, amounting to an estimated US$ 99 billion per year. In calculating the profits, 
it is assumed that wages and intermediate consumption make up about 30 per cent of 
the total earnings of forced labour victims in forced sexual exploitation.  
Victims of forced labour exploitation, including domestic work, agriculture and other 
economic activities, generate an estimated US$ 51 billion in profits per year. Out of 
those, the profits from forced labour in agriculture, including forestry and fishing, are 
estimated to be US$ 9 billion per year. This was calculated by estimating the difference 
between the value added accruing to labour (using the value added per worker, which 
was then multiplied by the labour share, conservatively estimated to be two thirds) and 
the wages paid to victims of forced labour in that sector, using information of the 2012 
Global Database. 
Profits for other economic activities are estimated at US$ 34 billion per year, 
encompassing construction, manufacturing, mining and utilities. In this case, the value 
added accruing to labour is calculated using the sector-specific average earnings 
divided by the labour share.  
Finally, it is estimated that private households employing domestic workers under 
conditions of forced labour save about US$8 billion annually by not paying or 
underpaying their workers. Those savings were calculated based on the difference 
between the wage that domestic workers should receive and the actual wages paid to 
domestic workers in forced labour. Based on information in the 2012 Global Database, it 
can be estimated that forced domestic workers are paid on average about 40 per cent 
of the wage they should receive.  
Profits per victim are highest in forced sexual exploitation, which can be explained by 
the demand for such services and the prices that clients are willing to pay, and by the 
low capital investments and low operating costs associated with this activity. With a 
global average profit of US$21,800 per year per victim, this sector is six times more 
profitable than all other forms of forced labour, and five times more profitable than 
forced labour exploitation outside domestic work. 
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Figure 5. Annual profit per victim by sector of exploitation (US$) 
 
Source: ILO 
 
Regional and sectoral distribution of workers  
This section describes the methodology used to distribute the 18.7 million victims of 
forced labour in the private economy worldwide in regional and sectoral estimates. The 
2012 Global Estimate provides the total number of forced labour victims per region, and 
the global number of victims per form of forced labour, but no regional distribution could 
be calculated using the capture-recapture methodology with acceptable margins of 
error. In the framework of this research on the economics of forced labour, and in 
absence of more detailed information, this report assumes that the distribution of victims 
across the three forms (forced labour exploitation, forced sexual exploitation and state-
imposed forced labour) is uniform across the regions. This would mean that in all regions 
under consideration, 10 per cent of the victims are in state-imposed forced labour, 68 
per cent are in forced labour exploitation in the private economy and 22 per cent are in 
forced sexual exploitation. 
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Table 2.2. Estimated number of victims by type of forced labour and region 
Region Forced sexual 
exploitation 
Forced labour 
exploitation 
State-
imposed 
forced labour 
Total 
Asia-Pacific                     
2,500,000  
                    
7,900,000  
                    
1,200,000  
                  
11,700,000  
Latin America & the 
Caribbean 
                      
400,000  
                    
1,200,000  
   
200,000  
                    
1,800,000  
Africa                       
800,000  
                    
2,500,000  
                      
400,000  
                    
3,700,000  
Middle East                       
100,000  
                     
400,000  
                      
100,000  
                      
600,000  
Central and South-
Eastern Europe & CIS 
                      
300,000  
                    
1,100,000  
                      
200,000  
                    
1,600,000  
Developed Economies & 
EU 
                      
300,000  
                    
1,000,000  
                      
200,000  
                    
1,500,000  
Total                     
4,500,000  
                  
14,200,000  
                    
2,200,000  
                  
20,900,000  
Source: ILO 
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding 
 
The profits made from forced labour are then estimated for forced sexual and labour 
exploitation in each region.  
In the absence of any reliable national surveys and figures on forced sexual exploitation, 
the distribution of victims resulting from this first assumption is difficult to assess. The 
patterns of recruitment, mainly based on deception and abuse of vulnerability, are quite 
well known from good qualitative research. The means of coercion applied to the 
victims, adults and children, male and female, have also been shown as means to 
extract more profits from the victims to force them to work more and prevent them from 
leaving the place of exploitation.  
The 14.2 million victims in forced labour exploitation work in all productive sectors of the 
economy. The profits they generate depend on their occupation and the industry they 
work in. Ideally, the profits should be calculated based on the distribution of workers in 
forced labour per industry for each region. This was not possible for obvious reasons of 
reliability of such a distribution, as no such information is yet available. The industries were 
limited to the following: agriculture, including forestry and fishing, manufacturing, 
construction, mining, utilities and domestic work, which are known to encompass the 
vast majority of victims in all regions.17 It was nevertheless decided to treat forced 
domestic workers separately from other victims of forced labour exploitation. This was 
done for two reasons: first, because they represent an important proportion of the 
victims of forced labour exploitation; and second, because the profits generated by 
domestic work could not be calculated with the same method used for other 
productive sectors. 
 
                                                   
17
 This was confirmed by the reports of forced labour collected by the ILO for the 2012 Global Estimate. 
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The economic data (salary, occupation and industry) collected in 2012 for the global 
estimate of forced labour was used to distribute the workers among economic sectors. 
This distribution should be seen and treated as a working hypothesis for the sole purpose 
of estimating the illicit profits from forced labour. These figures should not be quoted as 
new ILO estimates of the number of victims per sector per region. 
Nevertheless, this distribution was assessed with existing estimates and ILO knowledge on 
the patterns of forced labour worldwide.  
 
Table 2.3. Estimated number of victims of forced labour exploitation in the private economy 
by sector and region  
Region  Sectors  
 Domestic 
work 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing 
Construction 
manufacturing, 
mining and utilities  
Total 
Asia-Pacific                 
1,900,000  
        1,040,000  
4,970,000 
                
7,900,000  
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
                   
650,000  
          360,000  
190,000 
                
1,200,000  
Africa                    
570,000  
       1,130,000  
840,000 
                
2,500,000  
Middle East                    
270,000  
            10,000  
160,000 
                   
400,000  
Central and South-Eastern 
Europe and CIS 
    
30,000  
                   470,000  
550,000 
                
1,100,000  
Developed Economies 
and EU 
                     
30,000  
         530,000  
460,000 
                
1,000,000  
Total                 
3,440,000  
        3,530,000  
7,170,000 
              
14,200,000  
Source: ILO 
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding 
 
In 2011, the ILO presented a new estimate of 52.6 million domestic workers across the 
world in 2010.18 The estimate of 3.4 million domestic workers in forced labour used in the 
context of this report would result in a ratio of 6.5 per cent of domestic workers 
worldwide in forced labour. Regional disparities could be explained by the specific 
proportions of both child and migrant domestic workers in the various regions. Migration 
of domestic workers can be internal, regional or inter-regional, such as in the Middle 
East, where almost all migrant domestic workers come from Asia or Africa.  
The agriculture, forestry and fishing sector, according to the ILO, employs an estimated 
1.3 billion workers worldwide, or half of the world's labour force.19 Given this huge 
number of workers and the risks associated with forced labour described earlier, the 3.5 
million people conservatively estimated to be in forced labour in this sector seems 
                                                   
18
 ILO: Domestic workers across the world: Global and regional statistics and the extent of legal protection 
(Geneva, 2013).  
19
 http://www.ilo.org/safework/areasofwork/hazardous-work/WCMS_110188/lang--en/index.htm. 
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plausible. In many countries, agricultural work is largely informal, and legal protection of 
workers is weak.20  
In South Asia, there is still evidence of bonded labour in agriculture, resulting in labour 
arrangements where landless workers are trapped into exploitative and coercive 
working conditions in exchange for a loan. The low wages associated with high interest 
rates make it quite difficult for whole families to escape this vicious circle. 
In Africa, the traditional forms of “vestiges of slavery” are still prevalent in some countries, 
leading to situations where whole families (adults and children, men and women) are 
forced to work the fields of landowners in exchange for food and housing. 
 
In Latin America, the case of workers recruited in poor areas and sent to work on 
plantations or in logging camps has been widely documented by national inspection 
services and other actors.  
In industrialized countries, the share of migrant workers in the labour force in this sector is 
very important. This has been documented in the EU, with a recurrent use of seasonal 
migrant workers for example. In the United States, the National Center for Farmworker 
Health quoted in 201221 an estimate of more than 3 million migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers in the country. According to the National Agricultural Workers Survey 
(NAWS) 2007–2009, 72 per cent of all farmworkers in the United States were foreign-born. 
This high share of migrant workers is reflected in the number of cases of forced labour in 
this sector. 
The fishing sector has been documented recently as highly at risk of using forced labour. 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), an 
estimated 54.8 million people are working in the primary production of fish, including 38.3 
million on fishing vessels at sea, of which a large proportion are migrant workers from 
developing countries. The necessity to go increasingly further from the coasts to reach 
abundant fishing grounds leads to more crew being employed in long-distance fishing 
operations for long periods of time. The isolation resulting from these new fishing 
practices creates an environment conducive to exploitative working conditions.  
Cases of forced labour in construction, manufacturing, mining and utilities are found in 
all regions. The situation of migrant workers in debt bondage in brick kilns has been 
widely documented in South Asia. Migrant workers are recruited in poor countries to 
work on construction sites of richer countries all over the world. This is the case in the 
Middle East, with the recruitment of workers from Asia; in Central and South-Eastern 
Europe, with migrants from poorer countries from the same region; and in North America 
and the European Union, with intraregional or international migration. In some cases, 
workers are “posted”, with contracts tendered out to companies based in third 
countries. In the manufacturing sector, a clear example of the risk of forced labour 
linked to globalization can be found in the garment industry, especially in low-tier 
suppliers and home-based manufacturing. Following a string of reports concerning 
forced labour, this sector has been scrutinized for many years, and instances of forced 
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 First category in the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities- ISIC, Rev.4. 
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 http://www.ncfh.org/docs/fs-Migrant%20Demographics.pdf. 
 20 
 
labour have been successfully addressed through, for example, Better Work, a 
partnership programme between the ILO and the International Finance Corporation. 
Cases of forced labour were also reported in mining, either in small-scale mining or in 
low-skilled occupations in the sector. 
 
Profits from non-domestic forced labour exploitation 
In agriculture, it is possible to distinguish profits made from traditional forms of slavery, 
debt bondage and migrant workers.  
In the first case, the workers receive no or very little salary, and the whole family is 
involved, providing a large number of working hours for crops or herding animals, which 
will later be sold at market price. The housing and food provided to the landless families 
are usually of very low value, leading to very low intermediate expenditures and high 
profits.  
The same applies, to a certain extent, to migrant workers, whose salaries do not account 
for the high number of working hours imposed on them through the various means of 
coercion. The frequent cases of isolation make these forms of exploitation possible. In 
some instances, it has been shown how abusive employers profit from the isolation by 
forcing workers to buy food and basic items from their shops at prices much higher than 
market price. In addition, migrant workers are likely to have paid huge recruitment and 
transportation fees, which may be transformed into debt by the recruiter or employer, 
who will in turn impose high interest rates. All these elements are combined to increase 
the landowner’s or employer’s profits. 
Debt bondage has been widely studied in South Asia in particular, and it has been 
shown how recruiters abuse the vulnerability of poor landless farmers, offering wage 
advances that are later translated into strong means of coercion to impose more work 
and lower wages. 
The recent ILO report, Caught at sea: Forced labour and trafficking in fisheries,22 
revealed the mechanisms of recruitment, deception and coercion existing in this sector. 
The use of inadequately trained and informed migrant workers, the isolation of workers 
for months while at sea, regulatory gaps and the lack of law enforcement were shown 
as leading factors of forced labour and human trafficking in the sector. By underpaying 
these migrant workers, forcing them to work extremely long hours with no weekly rest 
and not respecting safety laws, the owners of these vessels are able to increase their 
profits.  
In the construction sector, cases of forced labour leading to huge illicit profits are 
regularly reported. Some cases on construction sites in Eastern Europe, for example, 
relied on both deception and corruption. Migrant workers are brought illegally to work 
on a construction site, without knowing the working conditions or terms of payment. 
There, they discover that they are forced to live together in a remote place provided by 
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 ILO: Caught at Sea Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries (Geneva, 2013). 
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the employer (to avoid police controls) and told that they will be paid only at the end of 
the construction. A few days before the end, when the work is done and wages are 
due, the owner may call a law enforcement officer to inform him of the presence of 
irregular migrants. The workers are then deported and the employer does not need to 
pay them. All due wages (minus the bribe) increase the profits made, thanks to the work 
of the abused migrants. 
In brick kilns, mechanisms of debt bondage linked to advances paid before recruitment 
have been shown to be extensively used by kiln owners to coerce the workers, force 
them to work more, accept low wages and stay until the end of the season, or even 
force them to come back the following year, up to the repayment of the loan. The low 
piece rate applied leads to employment of entire families, to increase production and 
reach the quota associated to the wage promised.  
These are a few examples on how threats, violence, deception and coercion are used 
by recruiters and employers to increase profits generated by the work of their 
employees.  
It is estimated that the profits made with the world’s 10.7 million victims of non-domestic 
forced labour exploitation reach US$43.4 billion per year, with an average annual profit 
of US$4,000 per victim. This profit is estimated to be the result of the exploitation of victims 
in agriculture on the one hand, and industrial sectors (construction, manufacturing 
mining and utilities) on the other.  
 
Table 2.4. Estimated annual profits from non-domestic private forced labour by sector and 
region (US$) 
Region Agriculture Other labour Total 
Asia-Pacific              400,000,000          13,400,000,000         13,800,000,000  
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
             200,000,000               800,000,000          1,000,000,000  
Africa           1,100,000,000            2,800,000,000          3,900,000,000  
Middle East               20,000,000               600,000,000             600,000,000  
Central and South-
Eastern Europe and CIS 
             700,000,000            3,000,000,000          3,600,000,000  
Developed Economies 
and EU 
          6,400,000,000          14,000,000,000         20,500,000,000  
Total           8,900,000,000          34,500,000,000         43,400,000,000  
Source: ILO 
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding 
 
Forced labour profits in agriculture are lower than the sum of other sectors,23 but are 
quite significant in terms of the number of workers. It is estimated that more than a third 
of the victims of forced labour in non-domestic sectors work in agriculture24 (including 
                                                   
23
 Industries B, C, D, E and F from ISIC Rev.4. 
24
 As per ISIC Rev.4, grouped under this industry are: agriculture, fishing and forestry. Per definition: “This 
section includes the exploitation of vegetal and animal natural resources, comprising the activities of growing 
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fishing and forestry as per the ISIC definition), amounting to 3.5 million of the 10.7 million 
people in forced labour exploitation other than forced domestic work. 
Based on the calculations, the average profit per victim is lower in agriculture than in 
other sectors in all regions. This reflects the low value added of agriculture worldwide. 
 
Table 2.5. Average annual profit per victim (US$) 
Region Agriculture Other labour 
Asia-Pacific                          400                        2,700  
Latin America and the Caribbean                          700                        4,100  
Africa                       1,000                        3,300  
Middle East                       2,900                        3,600  
Central and South-Eastern Europe and 
CIS 
                      1,400                        5,400  
Developed Economies and EU                      12,200                       30,400  
Total                       2,500                        4,800  
Source: ILO 
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding 
 
Methodology  
The definition of profits is the same as that of the 2005 working paper: 
 
where  is the number of forced labour victims under economic exploitation per 
region per sector,  is the value added accruing to labour per region per sector, and 
 the wages paid to forced labour victims per region per sector. 
To calculate the profits made from the use of forced labour in the private sector, 
excluding domestic work, the value added approach is used, combined with 
information from the 2012 Global Estimate database. The procedure to estimate the 
value added accruing to labour varies, depending on whether it is applied to the 
agriculture sector or other sectors (construction, manufacturing, mining and utilities). 
In the case of the agricultural sector, information on the value added per worker from 
the World Development Indicators (2006) was used. For each country, the value added 
per worker accruing to labour is calculated as: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
of crops, raising and breeding of animals, harvesting of timber and other plants, animals or animal products 
from a farm or their natural habitats.”. 
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where  is the value added per worker,  the value added accruing to labour, 
and  the conservative labour share estimated to be two-thirds. Correcting for any 
missing values and aggregating in each region, the average value added per worker in 
agriculture is obtained as: 
 
where , with  being the response weight and  the population 
weighting. 
Once the regional value added per worker accruing to labour has been established, 
the profits of forced labour victims are obtained as the difference between the value 
added per worker accruing to labour and the wage earnings of forced labour victims, 
multiplied by the number of victims in each region, i.e.: 
 
To calculate the wage earnings of forced labour victims, economic data on wages of 
victims stored in the 2012 Global Estimate database were used. The highest-reported 
earnings of the victims of forced labour in each sector are selected and, in cases where 
such information is missing for all victims from this region working in this sector, it is 
assumed that the victims earn the equivalent of US$1 Purchasing Power Parity in a 
selected country of that region. The ratio of earnings with respect to the minimum wage 
of the country in which this information is found is used as a representative percentage 
for all countries in that region to estimate the earnings of forced labour victims in each 
country of that region. A weighted average regional minimum wage is then calculated, 
using weights which are generated to take into account the size of the labour force in 
the sector and to correct for non-response.  
In the other industrial sectors, a similar methodology is used. The main difference is, 
however, in the calculation of the value added accruing to labour in each region. Firstly, 
as information on the average earnings of medium- to low-skilled workers was 
available25 (contrary to the agricultural sector, where it was scarce), the value added 
per worker is calculated as the ratio of the average monthly earnings of a worker and 
the conservative labour share for each of the three sectors (construction, 
manufacturing, mining and utilities), i.e.: 
 
where vacs is the value added per worker accruing to labour in country c in sector s, and 
aecs is the average earnings of medium- to low-skilled workers in country c in sector s. 
These are then weighted for non-response and by the size of the labour force in each of 
                                                   
25
 Information was taken from the ILO database on labour statistics operated by the ILO Department of 
Statistics (LABORSTA) on the average earnings of individuals in 151 occupations (ISCO-88) in various countries. 
The occupations are then reclassified based on the skill level. Those in low-to-middle skills are kept and 
regrouped based on the industry of employment (ISIC REV 4). 
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the sectors. The regional weighted average is then estimated as the average value 
added per worker accruing to labour using: 
 
where the final weights are , with  being the response weights and 
 the population weights. An average of these values is taken in each region to 
obtain the value added for each region in other non-agricultural non-domestic sectors, 
var. To obtain the average earnings of forced labour victims in each of these regions, 
the methodology described for the agricultural sector is used. The exception is, however, 
that once the sector specific wages, wrs, are obtained, they are weighted by the 
number of forced labour victims in each sector, , and an average is taken, i.e.: 
 
Annual profits are calculated as the difference between the value added accruing to 
labour in the region and the wages of the victims of the region, multiplied by the number 
of victims in the region and 12, i.e.: 
 
Based on the data available in the 2012 Global Estimate database, the monthly 
average earnings of forced labour victims were estimated by sector and region. 
 
Table 2.6. Average monthly earnings per victim of forced labour by sector and region (US$) 
 Monthly average earnings per victim (US$) 
   
Region Agriculture Other labour 
Asia-Pacific                      23.37                     162.70  
Latin America and the Caribbean                      135.8                       159.7  
Africa                         5.7                        35.1  
Middle East                       33.4                         117  
Central and South-Eastern Europe and CIS                       94.3                           47  
Developed Economies and EU                        327                         483  
Source: ILO 
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding 
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Profits from forced labour in domestic work 
It is estimated that nearly US$8 billion are literally stolen annually from the 3.4 million 
domestic workers in forced labour worldwide. This estimate is based on data collected 
by the ILO for the 2012 Global Estimate, which shows that domestic workers in forced 
labour are effectively deprived, on average, of 60 per cent of their due wages.  
As noted in the ILO 2005 working paper, domestic services create an economic value 
added, and therefore the savings made by the employer on expenditures count as 
profits. The stolen wages consist of a combination of monthly wages (which are lower 
than what they should be), abusive deductions for housing and food, and illegal 
deductions for recruitment costs. 
The global figure and regional distribution of the number of domestic workers in forced 
labour were estimated by combining the following: the share of reported cases of 
forced domestic work in the 2012 Global Estimate database of all reported cases of 
forced labour exploitation in the private economy; the regional distribution of domestic 
workers as estimated by the ILO in 2012;26 and the regional prevalence (per 1,000 
inhabitants) of forced labour as estimated in 2012 weighted by the relative proportion of 
live-in domestic workers across the regions.27 
 
Table 2.7. Average annual profits of forced domestic work (US$) 
Profits of forced  
domestic work 
 No. of  victims 
domestic workers 
 Annual profits Annual profit per 
victim 
Asia-Pacific                      1,900,000                 6,300,000,000                             3,300  
Latin America and the 
Caribbean                         650,000                    500,000,000                                800  
Africa                         570,000                    300,000,000                                600  
Middle East                         270,000                    400,000,000                             1,400  
Central and South-Eastern 
Europe and CIS                           30,000                    100,000,000                             1,700  
Developed Economies and EU                           30,000                    200,000,000                             7,500  
Total                      3,440,000                 7,900,000,000                             2,300  
Source: ILO 
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding 
 
For the special case of domestic workers, where value added is not directly measurable, 
profits are estimated as the difference between what domestic workers in forced labour 
earn on average, and what their counterparts who are not in forced labour should earn. 
The economic data stored in the 2012 Global Estimate database of reported cases of 
                                                   
26
 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
travail/documents/publication/wcms_155951.pdf. 
27
 Based on expert judgement and on a selected number of country studies. 
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forced labour show that, on average, domestic workers in forced labour are deprived of 
60 per cent of their due wages. The wages earned by forced labour victims in each 
sector of each region were first estimated using economic information available in the 
global database, then sorted out into regions and then sectors. For each region, the 
wages earned by victims were converted into US dollars and the highest reported wage 
was selected as the wage earned by forced labour victims. The percentage of stolen 
wage was then estimated by comparing the earnings of forced domestic workers in a 
country with the national minimum wage or average wages paid to domestic workers in 
that country. This ratio was used to calculate the ratio of stolen wage worldwide. 
This amount of stolen wages, or profit, varies between US$50 per month in Africa and 
more than US$600 per month in Developed Economies.  
The profits are estimated with the simple formula of the difference between the wages 
earned (obtained from the global database), , and the average wages domestic 
workers should get if working freely in the corresponding regions, .: 
 
where  is the number of forced labour victims (domestic workers) in region . 
From the ILO database of reported cases of forced labour, it is estimated that, on global 
average: 
 = .4 *  
   
 
Profits from forced sexual exploitation 
In addition to the coercion, threats and violence inflicted on the victims of forced sexual 
exploitation, one common feature is that the victim is not paid by the client, who instead 
must pay the agent (or pimp) or brothel owner directly. Many testimonies collected in 
qualitative surveys on this issue confirm this.  The victim is unaware of the amount the 
client has paid. There are also many instances of debt bondage, especially in the case 
of migrant victims, where the exploiter keeps all of the victim's earnings for months, 
without any proper accounting, ostensibly to reimburse the travel cost. In most cases of 
documented forced sexual exploitation, a whole chain of traffickers and exploiters 
benefits: the recruiter who imposes high recruitment fees; the people in charge of travel 
and transport, who make sure the victim safely reaches the place of exploitation; 
corrupted law enforcement paid to close their eyes to obvious cases of illegal migration 
or exploitation; owners of flats or houses; companies in charge of advertising; and, of 
course, the brothel owner or manager of the prostitution networks. 
The profits made on pornography using children or women against their will are 
extremely difficult to estimate and were not taken into account in the current estimate, 
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making the assumption for the calculation of the profits that all victims of forced sexual 
exploitation work as prostitutes. 
As in 2005, it should be noted that the fact that sex work is referred to as an activity, and 
that the revenue it generates is estimated, does not imply that the ILO endorses or 
legitimizes it. 
The total annual profits made from forced sexual exploitation are estimated at US$99 
billion worldwide. The profits are highest in Asia due to the large number of victims, but 
annual profits per victim are highest in Developed Economies (US$80,000) and the 
Middle East (US$55,000), due to the high average price of sexual encounters.   
 
Table 2.8. Annual profits from forced sexual exploitation (US$) 
Region   Number 
of victims  
 Monthly 
earnings 
per victim 
(Kara, 2009) 
 Annual profits   Annual 
profit per 
victim  
Asia-Pacific    2 500 000                   1 485  31 700 000 000        12 000  
Latin America and the 
Caribbean  
            400 
000  
                 3 200  10 400 000 000        27 000  
Africa              800 
000  
                 1 300  8 900 000 000        11 000  
Middle East              100 
000  
                 6 510  7 500 000 000        55 000  
Central and South-Eastern 
Europe and CIS  
            300 
000  
                 5 040  14 300 000 000        42 000  
Developed Economies and EU              300 
000  
                 9 540  26 200 000 000        80 000  
Total 4 500 000    99 000 000 000        22 000  
Source: ILO 
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding 
 
Methodology 
In the case of forced sexual exploitation, information on the value added is unavailable 
because of the nature of the work. Similar to the ILO’s 2005 working paper and Kara’s 
2009 study, the profits were estimated on the basis of estimated earnings of forced 
labour victims per encounter. In the absence of ILO figures on the number of encounters 
per month of each victim of forced sexual exploitation, and the average earnings per 
encounter, regional estimates published by Kara are relied upon. The 2005 ILO 
assumption that the profits made by the exploiter are around 70 per cent of the amount 
paid by the clients is maintained.  
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The estimate of the regional profits made is then replaced by the use of forced labour 
victims in sexual exploitation, calculated as: 
 
by 
 
where  represents the average regional intermediate consumption,  is the average 
regional price per encounter,  is the number of encounters, and  is the average 
regional wages of the victims. In the second formula, used for this report,  is the 
monthly amount from sale of sex in the region r, as estimated by Kara (2009).  is the 
number of forced labour victims in sexual exploitation.  
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Chapter 3 
What makes people vulnerable to forced labour? 
ver the last decade, the ILO has supported the efforts of various national 
governments and national statistical bodies to carry out surveys and data 
collection programmes with the aim of studying the extent and conditions of 
forced labour. The current analysis is based on surveys carried out in eight countries, with 
three different target groups: all members of a household (5 years of age and above); 
children (5 to 17 years of age); and returned adult migrants. These three populations 
were chosen according to the form of forced labour that was more likely to take place 
in the country. The main purpose of this chapter is to study the factors that make 
individuals vulnerable to forced labour.  
In Guatemala, Nepal and the Niger, where forced labour is likely to affect both adults 
and children from a same household, all members of the household were surveyed. A 
probit model was used as the basis of the analysis. In these three countries, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia28 and Côte d’Ivoire, special attention was given to the 
situation of children. 
Three of the eight surveys targeted returned migrants in the CIS area, namely Armenia, 
Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. For these countries, the determinants of forced 
labour among returned migrants using a trivariate probit model with double selection 
are presented in this report. The purpose is to understand what factors make migrants 
vulnerable to forced labour at their destination.  
This chapter starts with a brief literature review on the determinants of forced labour and 
continues with a descriptive analysis of the victims of forced labour found in the surveys, 
the methodology used and the results obtained through an analysis of ILO data sets.  
Theoretical discussion of the determinants of forced labour 
In the last decades, a number of studies have focused on slavery and its impact on 
economic development. One hypothesis is that increases in labour supply make slavery 
and forced labour a less attractive option, with the phenomenon occurring less in 
capital intensive sectors.29 Others, however, have argued that the effect of population 
growth will depend on production technology and the non-tradable skills that new 
                                                   
28
 The survey in the Plurinational State of Bolivia was a Child Labour Survey, which was not designed 
specifically to measure forced labour of children. The number of questions used to assess forced labour was 
smaller than in other surveys and the absolute number of victims was also smaller. This may explain that the 
results are not as solid as for the other countries and that the results quite often differ in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia compared to other surveys. 
29
 E. Domar: “The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis”, in The Journal of Economic History (1970, Vol. 
30, No. 1), pp. 18-32. 
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labour market entrants possess, especially in the agrarian economy.30 For example, in a 
study on the reversal of fortunes among countries colonized by European countries in 
the past 500 years, it was found that in regions where population density was high and 
labour relatively abundant, the European countries were more likely to employ labour-
coercive practices. The study hence emphasized the importance of the relationship 
between labour supply and labour coercion.31 
The argument was further developed in subsequent studies.32 Although coercion is 
socially inefficient, it always increases the efforts made by agents. Workers with fewer 
outside options are coerced more and provide higher levels of effort in equilibrium. The 
scarcity of labour encourages coercion through the labour demand effect, as it leads to 
an increase in the price of outputs, increasing the value of effort and thus making labour 
coercion a productive venture for producers. However, the scarcity of labour also 
decreases labour coercion through the outside option effect. In fact, labour scarcity 
increases the marginal product of labour in competing sectors of the economy and 
therefore increases the outside options, thus discouraging coercion. In addition, it could 
be demonstrated that there is an economies of scale effect, with the relative 
abundance of exploitable labour making coercion profitable.  
In 1984, another study was published33 that extended the transaction-costs model to 
study the extent ordinary benefits and pain incentives (threats and violence) 
respectively affect individuals in terms of how careful they are and the effort they exert. 
While threats or violence may make individuals exert more effort, it will make them 
careless. On the other hand, monetary incentives will make workers more careful but 
likely to exert less effort, as the benefit will be received not generally as immediately as 
the pain would be inflicted if they should not exert enough effort. The 1984 study finds 
that the former are in general more effort-intensive than care-intensive as opposed to 
the latter, and concludes that supervision is able to cheaply counter ill will, and therefore 
posits that slaves in care-intensive jobs will most often be motivated by rewards rather 
than pain.  
The impact of incentives, both rewards and threats, has also been studied; the 
conclusion is that victims of forced labour where violence is involved are often very poor 
individuals with extremely limited options.34 While the effect of labour supply 
(abundance versus scarcity) might appear slightly ambiguous, it is an important 
determining factor in the risk of ending up in forced labour. In addition, poverty and the 
lack of outside options for individuals also remain important risk factors. The presence of 
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 J. Conning: ”The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis 
Revisited”, Working Paper 401 (Hunter College: Manuscript, 2004). 
31
 D. Acemoglu et al.: “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World 
Income Distribution”, in The Quaterly Journal of Economics (2002, 117(4)), pp. 1231 - 1294. 
32
 D. Acemoglu and A.Wolitzky.: “The Economics of Labour Coercion”, in Econometrica (2011, 79,2), pp. 555 - 
600. The findings are consistent with R. Fogel and S. Engerman: Time on the Cross: The Economics of American 
Negro Slavery (Boston, Little Brown, 1974). 
33
 S. Fenoaltea: “Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model”, in The Journal of Economic 
History (1984, Vol. 44, No.3), pp. 635 - 638. 
34
 M.S.Y. Chwe: “Why were workers whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model”, in The Economic Journal 
(1990, 100), pp. 1109 - 1121. 
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slavery in the past can be associated with increased poverty, low educational 
enrolment in these regions and land inequality.35 
Descriptive analysis of the victims of forced labour 
In this section, the focus is on the descriptive analysis of the data used in studying the 
determinants of forced labour among different subgroups of the population. It is 
important to note that these results cannot be used to compare the situation of workers 
between the countries studied, as the survey design was specific to each country. While 
some surveys (the Niger) were national surveys targeting all households in the country, 
others (Nepal and Guatemala) targeted groups known to be highly vulnerable to forced 
labour. The target groups in Nepal were Haliya (landless agricultural labourers in far-
western Nepal, mostly from the Dalit community), Haruwa (people who plough land for 
others in exchange for land to cultivate or to repay a debt) and Charuwa (people 
mainly employed for herding cattle). The aim was to understand the patterns of forced 
labour among these populations rather than to estimate the prevalence of forced 
labour in the entire country. Moreover, the surveys in Nepal and Guatemala were not 
national surveys but limited to some provinces. 
Indicators of forced labour 
According to the ILO’s survey guidelines, an individual is considered to be working in 
forced labour if he or she was not freely recruited and faced some form of penalty at 
the time of recruitment, had to work and lives under duress and the menace of any 
penalty or cannot leave the employer because of the menace of a penalty.36  
As per the survey design, the population studied in Guatemala had the highest rate of 
employment compared to the target population surveyed in Nepal or the Niger. In the 
three countries, forced labour was estimated among employed people. Of those 
employed in the Niger, it is estimated that 1.8 per cent were working as forced labourers. 
This is a national figure and hence is much lower than Nepal’s 10.14 per cent and 
Guatemala’s 10.25 per cent, which had been estimated within a specific target 
population that was extremely vulnerable to forced labour.  
  
                                                   
35
 D. Acemoglu et al.: “Finding Eldorado: Slavery and Long-run Development in Colombia”, in Journal of 
Comparative Economics (2012, Vol. 40(4)), pp. 534 - 564. 
36
 Definitions of variables are in the annex. See also ILO: Hard to see, harder to count: Survey guidelines to 
estimate forced labour of adults and children (Geneva, 2012). 
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Table 3.1: Indicators of forced labour in the household (adults and children, %) 
Indicator  Nepal The Niger Guatemala 
Employed (within the sample) 35.0 68.6 86.2 
Forced labour 10.1 1.8 10.2 
Not freely recruited 9.1 1.9 21.5 
Impossibility to leave 5.9 - 2.0 
Limited freedom 4.3 1.3 - 
Live and work under duress - - 46.1 
Dependent individual 7.8 2.1 - 
Dependent household - 3.6 - 
Labour rights violation 14.6 - - 
Coerced/violence 12.7 1.137 13.6 
Guardian in forced labour - 2.97 17.97 
Source: ILO 
Dash ( – ) means missing value. 
 
Unfree recruitment was very common in Guatemala where more than 40 per cent of 
employed individuals were recruited either through deception or coercion. Individuals 
also faced restrictions in various forms, including limited freedom and impossibility to 
leave the employer. Some were not allowed to communicate with other family 
members. In most cases, employers resorted to the use of various threats to keep 
employees at work. This phenomenon was also common in Nepal where, in several 
cases, individuals were not allowed to leave their employers until all debts had been 
paid off.  
Some individuals were also highly dependent on their employers (8 per cent of the 
households affected by forced labour in the target groups in Nepal and 2.14 per cent of 
those employed in the Niger) for purposes not directly related to work, such as food and 
housing. This can also be the case for households as a whole. In Guatemala, about half 
of employed individuals were living and working under duress. Labour rights violations 
were only measured in Nepal and affected 14.62 per cent of employed individuals.  
Coercive means such as violence, threats of violence, confiscation of documents and 
physical, sexual and emotional abuse affected between 12.69 per cent and 13.59 per 
cent of employed individuals in Nepal and Guatemala. In the Niger, only children were 
analysed for coercion; less than 2 per cent were affected. When parents are in forced 
labour, their children also become vulnerable to it. That was the case in Guatemala with 
approximately 17.95 per cent of employed children having guardians who were 
considered to be in forced labour or vulnerable to forced labour.  
In the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Côte d’Ivoire, the focus was on children. Over 
one-quarter of the children in both countries were economically active. Children are 
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 Children only. 
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often forced to remain with their employers either through the refusal of employers to 
allow them to leave or through debt bondage and the issuing of threats.  
 
Table 3.2: Indicators of forced child labour (%) 
Indicator Nepal38 The Niger39 Guatemala40 P.S. of 
Bolivia41 
Côte 
d’Ivoire42 
Employed  4.9 50.49 81.2 33.5 26.5 
Forced labour (among 
employed children) 1.2 2.8 6.7 1.1 2.2 
Not freely recruited 1.0 3.0 18.0 0.3 4.9 
Impossibility to leave 4.4 1.5 1.9 1.2 5.6 
Live and work under duress - - 93.7 - - 
Dependent - 1.3 - - - 
Father in forced labour - 1.5 - - - 
Mother in forced labour - 1.1 - - - 
Coercion/Violence 3.8 1.1 8.5 2.2 - 
Source: ILO 
Dash ( – ) means missing value. 
 
In the case of returned migrants, information on coercive recruitment was only available 
in Armenia, where the main forms of coercion used in recruitment were debt bondage 
(4 per cent) and the confiscation of documents (1.76 per cent). By borrowing money 
from other individuals, the migrants became vulnerable to accepting whatever job they 
are presented to pay back the loans owed.  
Migrants are also sometimes recruited through abuse. Recruiters may take advantage of 
their recruits for specific reasons using different methods. The most common form of this 
kind of recruitment reported by Armenian returned migrants was abuse of a difficult 
financial situation (15.43 per cent). Some recruiters also took advantage of the irregular 
status of their victims once they reached their destination countries (5.35 per cent) and 
the difficult family situation of the individuals (4.99 per cent).  
Through deceptive recruitment, migrants are promised lucrative jobs with good 
employers, only to find often that most or all of the promises made at the time of 
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 This figure is not representative of the situation of children in Nepal. It was only measured in a limited 
group. 
39
 Organisation internationale du Travail (OIT) et Institut National de la Statistique du Niger (INS-Niger): 
Rapport de l’enquête nationale sur le travail des enfants au Niger de 2009 (Genève, 2011). 
40
 This figure is not representative of the situation of children in Guatemala. It was only measured in a specific 
target group. 
41
 See “Children at risk of forced labour in Bolivia: An analysis based on child labour surveys”, June 2010, Not 
published. 
42
 Ministère de la Fonction Publique et de l’Emploi, Institut National de la Statistique de la Côte d’Ivoire: Le 
travail des enfants en Côte d’Ivoire à partir de l’Enquête sur le Niveau de Vie des Ménages 2008 (BIT, Côte 
d’Ivoire, 2010). 
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recruitment are not fulfilled. In both the Republic of Moldova and Armenia, the most 
common form of deception reported involved wages. The victims often received wages 
that were much lower than initially promised or had their earnings unlawfully retained. 
Others ended up in working conditions that were worse than promised, or in entirely 
different jobs. Some of the returned migrants were forced to accept jobs, tasks or work 
under unacceptable conditions. They were frequently forced to stay longer at their 
place of work to get paid. Others had to do excessive work, sometimes without pay. 
 
Table 3.3: Indicators of forced labour among returned migrants (%) 
Indicator Rep. of Moldova43 Armenia44 Georgia45 
Forced labour/trafficking 8.2 5.9 8.5 
Not freely recruited 14.16 14.63 - 
Exploitative working conditions 40.12 55.07 71.24 
Coerced 8.16 5.88 10.21 
Source: ILO 
Components may not add up to the total because of rounding. Dash ( - ) means missing value. 
 
The main forms of exploitative working conditions that returned migrants in all three 
countries were reported to have faced include low salaries, delayed payments, 
imposed poor living conditions, excessive work and the lack of social protection. In the 
Republic of Moldova, for example, 45.64 per cent of returned migrants had to work for 
little or no pay while 24.85 per cent received late payments. In Armenia and Georgia the 
results were almost similar, with 20.22 per cent and 19.76 per cent respectively working 
for little or no salary. The returned migrants often faced multiple forms of exploitation. 
To keep migrants working under these conditions, some form of coercion was usually 
applied. The main form of coercion used was the withholding of salary, for 13.5 per cent 
of Moldovan, 6.09 per cent of Armenian and 9.62 per cent of Georgian returned 
migrants. About 4.38 per cent of Moldovan returned migrants were threatened with 
financial punishment, while 5.14 per cent of Armenian returned migrants and 4.08 per 
cent of Georgian returned migrants were threatened with financial punishment or kept 
in isolation. 
Returned migrants were not considered as freely recruited if they were recruited under 
false pretences, made to work in a different location from that initially agreed, in a 
different type of job or with a different employer, under conditions not specified in the 
contract signed, or if recruited coercively or by abuse of vulnerability, etc. They were 
considered as exploited if they had to work excessive hours, live or work under poor 
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 “Labour migration from Moldova: From successful migration to forced labour", April 2010. 
44
 “Labour migration from Armenia in 2008-2009: Labour migration trends and insight into migration 
experiences”, May 2010.  Not published. 
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 “Labour migration and risk of trafficking from Georgia, 2008”,  National centre of the research resources and 
statistics, April 2010. 
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conditions, if they were paid very low salaries, faced violence from employers and 
colleagues, carried out hazardous work with no protection, or did not receive social 
protection. They were considered as working under coercion if they had to work under 
violence or threats of violence, physical or otherwise, if forced to work to pay back 
loans, threatened with denunciation to authorities, or had documents confiscated. 
Based on this classification, between 40 per cent and 72 per cent of the returned 
migrants faced some form of exploitation and another 8–11 per cent were coerced. 
Roughly 15 per cent faced some form of deception during the recruitment process.  
Demographics 
There appears to be an ambiguous relationship between age and forced labour. At the 
level of the household (both adults and children), the average age of forced labour 
victims was much lower than that of workers not in forced labour in all countries except 
Guatemala. Focusing on just children, the difference between the ages of the freely 
employed children and those engaged as forced labour is only slight. Again, younger 
children appear to be more vulnerable to forced labour in all countries except in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Guatemala. The differences are significant in all cases. 
Among returned migrants, the average age of those who became victims to forced 
labour was lower than that of those who found work as free labourers. Thus, on the 
whole, it appears that forced labour victims are much younger except in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Guatemala, where they are slightly older.  
Focusing on gender, women are generally under-represented in the labour market. 
According to the ILO, the employment-to-population ratio was 72.7 for males and 24.8 
for females in 2012 worldwide.46 The surveys of forced labour show, however, that 
women who are economically active are less likely than men to be in forced labour, 
even in the case of returned migrants. 
Education and literacy 
The surveys show that the people in forced labour have a lower literacy level, whether 
they are adults or children. The literacy level of the parents (or heads of household) is 
lower for the children in forced labour than those not in forced labour. The same applies 
to returned migrants who found work abroad, for whom literacy appeared to have an 
effect, although slight. Across all three countries – Armenia, Georgia and the Republic of 
Moldova –workers with a high level education were more represented in the category of 
freely employed workers and less represented among forced labour victims.  
Wealth and Income Shocks 
There was no measure of poverty at the household level. However, for a few of the 
countries, income shocks and food security were measured. In the Niger, a higher 
percentage of forced labour victims than those in non-forced labour were from 
households in which there had been a decline in revenue. The same applies for both the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and the Niger in the case of children. In Nepal, food security 
was used as an indirect measure of poverty in households; members were asked if they 
had enough food to eat year-round. Only a few of the forced labour victims lived in 
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households with food security (9 per cent) compared to freely employed individuals (56 
per cent). The results remain unchanged even for children.  
In the case of returned migrants, the only indicator of poverty was credit related. A 
higher percentage of the victims of forced labour borrowed to finance their trips 
compared to those who were successful in their migration and thus did not end up in 
forced labour.  
 
Determinants of forced labour at the household level 
The probit model 
The probit model seeks to econometrically identify and analyse the factors that make 
individuals vulnerable to forced labour.47 The variable of interest is an indicator that takes 
on the value of 1 if an individual worked as a forced labourer during the period of 
analysis, and 0 otherwise. When dealing with binary variables, the usual model of choice 
is either the probit or the logit model. For this analysis, a probit model was used. This 
model was chosen to homogenize results with that obtained in later sections when the 
trivariate probit model was used to study the determinants of forced labour among 
returned migrant workers. 
Based on this, the probability that the individual i in household j will be in forced labour, 
, can be defined as: 
 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution,  is 
the set of independent (explanatory) variables, and  the vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated.  
Forced labour measured at the household level: The results 
The results are presented in the form of marginal effects that measure the change in the 
probability of the individual under analysis ending up in forced labour given a unit 
change in the explanatory variables (for the case of discrete variables, it is the effect of 
a change in status from 0 to 1). Where necessary, results for forced child labour are 
presented separately.  
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Table 3.4: Determinants of forced labour at the household level 
Variable The Niger Nepal Guatemala 
Age 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0062*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0072*** 
(0.0001) 
Age 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Female 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0173*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0989*** 
(0.0008) 
Literate 
-0.0049*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0115*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0414*** 
(0.0011) 
Haruwah-Charuwah - 
0.1992*** 
(0.0013) - 
Haliya - 
0.1955*** 
(0.0013) - 
Literate head of household 
-0.0109*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0103*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0235*** 
(0.0010) 
Age of head of household 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
Female head of household 
0.0056*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0335*** 
(0.0013) 
Size of household 
0.0016*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0051*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0050*** 
(0.0002) 
% of children < 5 in household 
-0.0115*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0438*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0167*** 
(0.0029) 
% of elderly (> 60) in household  
0.0186*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.1385*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0892*** 
(0.0049) 
% of male adults (18-60) in 
household 
0.0085*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0108*** 
(0.015) 
0.0337*** 
(0.0040) 
Rural 
-0.0133*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0029*** 
(0.0006) - 
Tarai - 
0.0478*** 
(0.0006) - 
Revenue decline 
0.0039*** 
(0.0001) - - 
Food security - 
-0.0557*** 
(0.0004) - 
Number of obs. 12446 11427 4211 
R 0.0505 0.5583 0.0682 
Source: ILO 
Dash ( – ) means missing value. 
1. Each column presents the probability of an individual ending up in forced labour. The marginal effects are reported after 
running a probit model in STATA. 
2. The number in brackets below the marginal effect is the standard error. The significance level is represented by stars 
where: *** = 1 per cent level, ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level. 
 
Demographics 
The counter-intuitive finding of the study is that women and girls are generally less likely 
to be in forced labour irrespective of their age. Being female as opposed to male 
reduces the probability of a household member aged 5 or older being in forced labour 
by 0.21 percentage points (in the Niger), to 9.89 percentage points (in Guatemala). 
While being female leads to a decrease of about 0.55 to 1.01 percentage points, the 
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result is positive in Nepal where female children appear more likely than their male 
counterparts to be in forced labour if they are employed.  
The impact of the gender of the head of household on the likelihood of its members 
being victims of forced labour appears to be clear: households headed by women were 
more likely to be affected by forced labour than those headed by men. In Nepal, 
however, members of a houseful headed by women were less likely to be in forced 
labour. This could be related to the fact that in Nepal, the female-headed households 
were less likely to be Haliya, Haruwah-Charuwah.  
In terms of location, living in a rural area reduces the probability of a person being in 
forced labour by about 0.29 to 1.33 percentage points in Nepal and the Niger, 
respectively. Children were also less likely to be in forced labour if they lived in rural areas 
(0.29 to 1.94 percentage points in Côte d’Ivoire and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
respectively). The exception is in Nepal, where living in rural areas increased the 
probability of an employed child being in forced labour by about 20.7 percentage 
points. This is because the population at risk studied in this survey is located in rural areas. 
While the child dependency ratio increases the probability of household members being 
in forced labour in Nepal and Guatemala, this was not proven in the Niger.  
Education and literacy 
With the exception of Guatemala where, surprisingly, the literate were more likely to be 
in forced labour (4.14 percentage points), being literate leads to a maximum 1.15 
percentage point decrease in the probability of household members being in forced 
labour. Individuals in households with literate heads were less likely to be in forced 
labour. For children, what matters is the literacy and education level of the household’s 
decision-maker. This is often either the head of the household or the parent. In cases 
where no information on the education of the parent was available, the head of the 
household’s education was used.  
The education of the fathers, which impacts household income, has a negative effect 
on forced labour. Having an educated father reduces the probability of an employed 
child ending up in forced labour by 0.17 per cent in the Plurinational State of Bolivia to 
2.82 per cent in Côte d’Ivoire. If a child is in a household with an educated mother, the 
decrease can be by about as much as 5.65 per cent.  
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Table 3.5: Determinants of forced child labour 
Variable The 
Niger 
Nepal Guatemala P.S. of 
Bolivia 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Age 0.0079*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0134*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0027*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0244) 
-0.0059*** 
(0.0002) 
Age1 0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
Female -0.0101*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0345*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0210*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0055*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0089*** 
(0.0002) 
Indigenous - - - 0.0016*** 
(0.0003) 
- 
Ivorian - - - - 0.0002*** 
(0.0156) 
Haruwah-Charuwah - 0.5928*** 
(0.0049) 
- - - 
Haliya - 0.6188*** 
(0.0183) 
- - - 
Mother’s education -0.0107*** 
(0.0006) 
- -0.0273*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0062*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0565*** 
(0.0007) 
Father’s education -0.0215*** 
(0.0003) 
- -0.0035*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0017*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0282*** 
(0.0003) 
Literate head - 0.0414*** 
(0.0028) 
- - - 
Age of head 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
Female Head -0.0013*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0359*** 
(0.0052) 
0.1212*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0053*** 
(0.0003) 
Size of household 0.0040*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0235*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0071*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0000) 
% of children < 5 in Household -0.0018*** 
(0.0012) 
0.1494*** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0533*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0387*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0177*** 
(0.0008) 
% of elderly (> 60) in Household 0.1719*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.3872*** 
(0.0207) 
0.0458*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0637*** 
(0.0014) 
% of male adults (18-60) in 
household  
0.0797*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0572*** 
(0.0144) 
0.0494*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0102*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0135*** 
(0.0011) 
Rural -0.0166*** 
(0.0005) 
0.2070*** 
(0.0079) 
- -0.0194*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0029*** 
(0.0003) 
Tarai - 0.0728*** 
(0.0034) 
- - - 
Revenue decline -0.0044*** 
(0.0003) 
- - 0.0063*** 
(0.0003) 
- 
Food security - -0.1377*** 
(0.0029) 
- - - 
Number of obs. 3307 800 1753 3376  
R2 0.0824 0.3845 0.1408 0.1008  
Source: ILO 
Dash ( – ) means missing value. 
1. Each column presents the probability of an individual ending up in forced labour. The marginal effects are reported after 
running a probit model in STATA. 
2. The number in brackets below the marginal effect is the standard error. The significance level is represented by stars 
where: *** = 1 per cent level, ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level. 
3. The measure of parental education is an interaction variable of the presence of the parent in the house and their literacy. 
In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, however, there is no measure of parental presence and thus the measure is only 
whether they were educated or not, while in Côte d’Ivoire it is an interaction between parental presence and whether 
the parent attended school. 
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Household vulnerability 
Direct measures of wealth are not used in the estimation model due to the importance 
of credit in the measurement of forced labour. Instead, measures such as income shocks 
and food security are used. In the Niger, a reduction in income for the household as a 
whole increases the probability that a member will be engaged in forced labour by 
about 0.39 per cent. The result is not as clear if the situation of children is studied 
independently from the whole household, with contradictory results in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, for example.  
In terms of food security, data were only available for Nepal where food security had a 
negative effect on the probability of household members ending up in forced labour. 
This effect is extremely high, about 5.57 percentage points for household members as a 
whole, irrespective of their age, and about 13.77 percentage points for children. This 
variable, though important, is missing for the other two surveys (the Niger and 
Guatemala) where the household situation was studied. Its high value might help explain 
the low R2 obtained for the other two countries where the variable is missing.  
 
Determinants of forced labour among returned migrants 
The trivariate probit model 
A modified probit model was used to study the factors that make migrants vulnerable to 
forced labour. As full information is only available on the conditions of work of the 
returned migrants (and not on the migrants who are still working abroad), they are the 
only group that can be fully identify as either being in forced labour or not. This creates a 
selection problem that must be taken into consideration. The dependent variable of 
interest is , and it is related to the indicator variable , which takes on the value of 
1 if returned migrant  was in forced labour at their last destination, and a value of 0 if 
not. This variable, however, is only observed for migrants who have returned to their 
country of origin and thus were interviewed. Using a trivariate probit model48, it is possible 
to correct for selection bias in the study of the determinants of migrant forced labour.  
In the migration equation, the variable of interest, , is related to the variable , an 
indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the individual was a migrant (present or 
absent at time of interview), and 0 otherwise. The variable of interest in the return 
migration equation is , associated with the observed indicator variable , which 
takes on the value of 1 if the individual is a returned migrant, and 0 if the individual is still 
absent from the household. Thus the model of interest becomes: 
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 V. Carreón Rodriguez and J. Garcia-Menéndez, “Trivariate Probit with Double Sample Selection: Theory and 
Application”, Working papers No DTE 520 (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Aconomicas, División de 
Economía, México, 2011); J.R. Ashford, J. R. and R.R. Sowden, “Multi-Variate Probit Analysis”, in Biometrics, 
Vol. 26, No. 3 (International Biometric Society, 1970), pp. 535-546. 
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where  is the intercept,  the vector of coefficients associated with independent 
variables , with  being the associated correlation coefficients for  and , 
respectively. The idiosyncratic component is .  
The two selection levels imply that there are four types of individuals: those who did not 
migrate, those who migrated but did not return, those who migrated and returned but 
were not in forced labour, and those who migrated and returned and were in forced 
labour at their final destination country. Full information is only available for the last two.  
Determinants of forced labour among returned migrants: The results 
Three groups of respondents were studied: non-migrants, absent migrants and returned 
migrants. The correlation coefficients in Armenia and Georgia are all significant, implying 
that there is indeed some level of selection bias. The error terms are all correlated except 
in Armenia, where there appears to be no correlation between the error terms of the 
forced labour regression and migration regression. This means that there are common 
factors that make individuals vulnerable to forced labour and more likely to return to 
their country of origin, as well as common factors that make individuals choose to 
migrate and that also make them vulnerable to forced labour. In addition there are 
common factors that make individuals decide to migrate and to return. It is important to 
account for these correlations, as the three groups are generally not independent. The 
trivariate model takes this into account. Its results are presented in the next subsections.  
 
Table 3.6: Correlation coefficients 
Variable Rep. of Moldova Armenia  Georgia 
 
0.2081*** 
(0.0473) 
-0.6488*** 
(0.0188) 
-0.8666*** 
(0.0121) 
 
0.2528*** 
(0.0294) 
0.0179 
(0.0244) 
-0.3823*** 
(0.0128) 
 
0.3280*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.2800*** 
(0.0223) 
-0.3188*** 
(0.0128) 
Source ILO 
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Demographics and literacy 
Contextual factors, such as the individual’s characteristics and the characteristics of the 
household to which the individual belongs, are included in the regression analysis. In the 
Republic of Moldova, returning male migrants were more likely than females to have 
ended up in forced labour at their last destination country. 
Similarly, individuals with only a primary-education level or below were also more likely to 
be victims of forced labour than their more educated counterparts. In Armenia, 
however, returning female migrants were more likely than males to have been in forced 
labour (but less likely to have been deceived). In the three countries under 
consideration, being of rural rather than urban origins increased the probability of an 
individual ending up in forced labour at their destination country by between 0.83 
percentage points in the Republic of Moldova and 5.71 percentage points in Georgia. 
The destination was also a determinant; individuals who went to CIS countries faced a 
higher probability of ending up in forced labour than those who did not. For example, 
going from the Republic of Moldova to a CIS country increased the probability of being 
in forced labour by about 0.3 percentage points, all else being constant.  
Irregular migrants are more likely to be in forced labour than migrant workers with a 
regular status. In this model, being an irregular migrant as opposed to a regular migrant 
increases the probability of being in forced labour by about 0.39 percentage points in 
the Republic of Moldova to 13.84 percentage points in Georgia, all else being constant.  
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Table 3.7: Determinants of forced migrant labour 
Variable Rep. of Moldova  Armenia  Georgia 
Age at migration 0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0149*** 
(0.0021) 
Age at migration -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
Female -0.0067*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0780*** 
(0.0095) 
- 
Married -0.0017 
(0.0052) 
-0.0450*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0427*** 
(0.0062) 
Primary 0.0080*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0401*** 
(0.0052) 
 
Rural 0.0083*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0097*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0571*** 
(0.0058) 
Situation before leaving    
Employed 0.0025*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1120*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.1443*** 
(0.0096) 
Student 0.0065*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0967*** 
(0.0095) 
- 
Other 0.0039*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0365*** 
(0.0053) 
- 
CIS 0.0028*** 
(0.0005) 
- 0.0231*** 
(0.0056) 
Lender    
Relatives/friends 0.0035*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0843*** 
(0.0067) 
- 
Third party 0.0081*** 
(0.0014) 
0.1295*** 
(0.0099) 
- 
Amount borrowed -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
- 
Paid for departure    
Relatives/friends - 0.0156*** 
(0.0027) 
- 
Third party - -0.0575*** 
(0.0051) 
- 
Legislation fully known - -0.0302*** 
(0.0032) 
- 
Recruitment fee    
Relatives/friends 0.0051*** 
(0.0102) 
- - 
Third party 0.0132*** 
(0.0022) 
- - 
Illegal resident 0.0039*** 
(0.0007) 
0.1384*** 
(0.0115) 
0.0525*** 
(0.0065) 
Sector of work    
Qualified workers in industries 0.0084*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0566*** 
(0.0048) 
0.2416*** 
(0.0129) 
Low-skilled workers 0.0052*** 
(0.0009) 
0.1694*** 
(0.0092) 
0.1379*** 
(0.0092) 
Skilled agriculture 0.0083*** 
(0.0020) 
0.3754*** 
(0.0165) 
0.2350*** 
(0.0169) 
Service/commerce 0.0109*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0235*** 
(0.0043) 
- 
 
Source ILO. Dash ( - ) means missing value.NOTES: For each the marginal effects are reported. The cmp in STATA developed by Roodman is 
used for the analysis. The number in brackets below the marginal effect is the standard deviation of the coefficients.  
The significance level is represented by stars where: *** = 1 per cent level, ** = 5 per cent level and * = 10 per cent level.  
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Recruitment fees and debt 
In the surveys that targeted returned migrants, no direct information was available on 
the income levels of the migrants prior to migration. The only information that could be 
used as proxy is whether they borrowed to finance their trip. Borrowing from third parties, 
even from relatives and friends as opposed to not borrowing at all, leads to an increase 
in the probability that an individual will end up in forced labour. While borrowing in itself 
has a significant impact on the individual’s vulnerability to forced labour, the amount 
borrowed appears not to have much impact. Those who borrowed from relatives and 
friends as opposed to not borrowing faced an increase in the probability of being in 
forced labour by about 0.35 percentage points in the Republic of Moldova to 8.43 
percentage points in Armenia.  
Considering just the Moldovan returned migrants, the payment of recruitment fees, even 
to relatives or friends, leads to a higher probability of ending up in forced labour. Paying 
recruitment fees leads to an increase in the probability of an individual ending up in 
forced labour by about 0.51 percentage points and 1.32 percentage points if the fees 
were paid to relatives and friends and to third parties, respectively. In both Armenia and 
Georgia, recruitment fees are not included in the regression analysis due to the small 
number of individuals who actually paid such fees. 
Occupation 
In this model, occupations are broken down into qualified industry workers, low-skilled 
workers, skilled agriculture workers and service/commerce and other professional 
workers. The reference group for the Republic of Moldova and Armenia is other 
professional workers, while in Georgia it is service/commerce workers and other 
professional workers due to the fact that there were not enough other professional 
workers. Skilled agricultural workers faced an increase in probability of being in forced 
labour across all three countries due to their occupation as opposed to being in the 
reference occupations. The returned migrants in the Republic of Moldova and Armenia 
faced between a 0.83 percentage point and a 37.54 percentage point increase in 
probability of being in forced labour if they were skilled agriculture workers as opposed 
to workers in professional occupations. In Georgia, they faced a 23.50 percentage point 
increase in their probability of being in forced labour if they were in skilled agriculture as 
opposed to professional occupations.  
A similar result is found in the services occupations among the Moldovan returned 
migrants; they faced a 1.09 percentage point increase in their probability of being in 
forced labour with respect to the reference category. In Armenia, however, the effect 
was the opposite. The returned migrants in the services sector were less likely to have 
faced forced labour compared to those in other professional occupations.  
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Conclusions 
“I had not then learned the measure of “man’s inhumanity to man,” nor to what limitless 
extent of wickedness he will go for the love of gain.”  
― Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave (1853) 
Those words were written by Solomon Northup in “Twelve Years a Slave” more than 150 
years ago, but they ring as true today as they did then.  More than a century after being 
banned in the developed world, and decades after being outlawed in the newly 
emerging developing world, modern forms of slavery—forced labour, human trafficking, 
forced sexual exploitation—still exist, and unfortunately risk growing in extent and 
profitability in the world today. 
As this report has shown, the profits from forced labour, as generated on the backs of 
largely working poor who are desperately searching for a decent job and a better life 
are more than three times the ILO’s previous estimates.  
Put into perspective, the 21 million victims in forced labour and the more than US$150 
billion in illegal profits generated by their work exceeds the population and GDP of many 
countries or territories around the world. Yet this vast nation of men, women and 
children, along with its resources, remains virtually invisible, hidden behind a wall of 
coercion, threats and economic exploitation. 
Since its first Global Report on Forced Labour was issued in 2001, the ILO’s Special Action 
Programme to combat Forced Labour has led the way in marshalling concrete global 
action. The ILO’s two international standards on forced labour have been nearly 
universally adopted, and today form the basis of binding international law that has been 
embraced by most ILO member States. This new report builds on the 2012 Global 
Estimate, and new methodologies and surveys, to take the understanding of forced 
labour, its extent and its profits to a new level. 
The report indicates that while unscrupulous employers and criminals reap huge profits 
from the illegal exaction of forced labour, the losses incurred by the victims are also 
enormously significant. People in forced labour are often caught in a vicious cycle that 
condemns them to endless poverty. They may suffer personal trauma that will require 
years to overcome as they try to rebuild their lives. At the same time, law-abiding 
businesses and employers are disadvantaged by forced labour as it creates an 
environment of unfair competition and risks tarnishing the reputation of entire industries 
and sectors. And governments and societies are also harmed because the profits 
generated by forced labour bypass national tax collection systems, and the costs 
involved in dealing with forced labour cases are significant.  
The impact of poverty and income shocks is central to the understanding of forced 
labour. Individuals living in poverty are more likely to be in forced labour and to borrow 
money, leading to an increase in vulnerability to forced labour or a family member 
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being held in debt bondage. In addition, income shocks that push households further 
into poverty, and often below the food poverty line, also increase the likelihood of 
exposure to forced labour. These households are more likely to need emergency funds, 
eventually relying on third parties to support their families. This heavy dependence on 
other individuals can lead to manipulation, coercion, exploitation and deception, 
especially if a creditor is a recruiter or trafficker. 
The choice of a specific occupation also has an impact on whether the person ends up 
in forced labour. Forced labour is more common in unskilled occupations in agriculture, 
fishing, domestic work, manufacturing and other work requiring low levels of education 
and skills. Informal sector workers are more vulnerable to forced labour than workers who 
possess enforceable employment contracts.  
Education and literacy are very important factors, both in terms of vulnerability to, and in 
the elimination of, forced labour. Educated individuals are less likely to be in basic forms 
of manual labour, and are more likely to know their rights. Literate individuals can read 
contracts and recognize situations that could lead to exploitation and coercion. In 
addition, households headed by educated persons are more likely to be better off and 
thus less likely to borrow, especially in the event of unforeseen income shocks. 
Gender is another important factor that determines the likelihood of being in forced 
labour, especially in relation to specific economic activities. According to the ILO’s 
Global Estimate, about 55 per cent of all victims are women and girls. In forced sexual 
exploitation and in domestic work, the vast majority of victims are women and girls. In 
other economic activities, however, men and boys tend to be disproportionally 
represented. According to survey data discussed in this chapter, men and boys are 
slightly more at risk of falling victim to forced labour than women and girls. This can be 
explained by the selection of surveys, and a particular focus on bonded labour or debt 
bondage.  
Previous ILO studies have shown that it is usually the male head of the household that 
borrows from moneylenders and hence pledges his labour as collateral. But this often 
implies that the entire family is considered to be bonded. Some country surveys show 
that male migrants were more often in forced labour than women, depending very 
much on the choice of destination country. Other country surveys show that single 
female headed households were more at risk of forced labour than male headed 
households. Thus, while, gender is an important factor determining the risk of forced 
labour, it is often contextual and there are great variances across countries, sectors and 
forms of forced labour.  
Finally, migration is an important risk factor. Surveys that focused on migrant workers in 
Eastern Europe showed a clear correlation between the need to borrow money for the 
payment of recruitment fees and the risk of ending up in forced labour. The level of 
education also played a role, as educated migrants were less likely to be in forced 
labour. Finally, the choice of destination country and the legal status of migrant workers 
in that country played a significant role in determining the likelihood of being in forced 
labour. An irregular situation entails a higher risk to be exposed to forced labour than 
regular migration and employment status. 
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What needs to be done? There is a critical need to expand the current knowledge base 
on forced labour through standardized data collection methods across countries. Such 
standardization and regular data collection would enable the ILO and other 
international organizations to generate more reliable global figures, measure trends and 
better understand risk factors. Better data and research will also contribute to the design 
of more effective programmes and policies. Following the resolution of the International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians adopted in September 2013, the ILO will now 
establish a working group of statisticians, economists and other experts to further 
advance data collection and research in this area. 
However, if the lives of the 21 million men, women and children in forced labour are to 
be significantly changed, concrete and immediate action is needed. The fact that, with 
limited deterrence, huge profits can be made from millions of poor and uneducated 
workers provides a compelling argument for stronger government intervention and 
social and economic development. Despite enhanced enforcement action against 
forced labour and human trafficking in recent years, it remains a low risk and high gain 
enterprise. This has to change. 
Measures are needed to strengthen laws and policies and reinforce inspection in sectors 
where the risk of forced labour is high. This should be linked to an early identification 
system of victims and their effective protection. Labour rights violations should be swiftly 
punished and criminal sanctions should be imposed on those who prey on particularly 
vulnerable workers. Workers need to be empowered by supporting their organization 
and access to remedies. 
There is also a need to strengthen preventive measures and address specific risk factors. 
Social protection can prevent household vulnerability to sudden income shocks and 
debt bondage. Access to education and skills training can enhance the bargaining 
power of workers and prevent children in particular from becoming victims of forced 
labour. Measures to promote social inclusion and address discrimination against women 
and girls can also go a long way towards preventing forced labour. Good migration 
governance can enhance the positive development impact of migration and prevent 
the exploitation and abuse of migrant workers. 
The need to address the socio-economic root causes of this hugely profitable illegal 
practice is urgent. Comprehensive measures are required that involve governments, 
workers, employers and other stakeholders working together to end forced labour. The 
continued existence of forced labour is bad for its victims, for business and 
development. It is a practice that has no place in modern society and should be 
eradicated as a matter of priority. 
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Appendix  
 
1. Definitions 
An individual was considered to be employed if they engaged in any economic activity 
within the reference period used in the survey. 
An individual is considered to be working in forced labour if they 
• had not been freely recruited and faced some form of penalty at time of recruitment 
or 
• had to work and live under duress and the menace of any penalty or 
• could not leave their employer because of a menace of a penalty 
A child is all persons below the age of 18. 
An adult is defined as an individual who is older than 17 years. 
A returned labour migrant is an individual who migrated to work abroad and returned to 
their country of origin at any point in time within the 12 months preceding the interview. 
This individual has to be present in the household at the time of interview. 
A household is affected by forced labour if at least one of its member, adult or child, is a 
victim of forced labour. 
 
2. Profits from the Illegal Use of Forced Labour 
Dealing with non-response 
Both data sets have missing values and we have to correct for this. Following ILO (2013), 
non-response is treated as a sampling problem. Countries for which data is available 
may be different from those for which data is unavailable, Peress (2010). To correct for 
this bias the estimate is often weighted such that the distribution for the observed 
variable in the sample matches the distribution of the population. One way to do this is 
via the variable response propensity estimator, ILO (2012). 
Response Weight 
Each country i is assumed to provide information on sector j with a probability, , 
independently of each other. The inverse of this response probability is then use as a 
weight in calculating the final estimated number of workers in each sector in each 
sector. In order to calculate the probability of non-response, we create a dummy 
variable, , which takes on the value of 1 if the country i provides information on our 
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variable of interest for sector j, that is the size of the work force in a given sector, and 0 
otherwise. 
 We therefore calculate the response probabilities using a probit model. Thus we 
estimate  
 =		 +	 
where  denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the probit regression,  is 
the intercept and  the matrix of independent variables to be used in estimating the 
probabilities. 
Response Weights: The Dependent Variables 
The estimation of the profits depends on three main variables, the size of the workforce 
in each sector, the value added per sector and the minimum wage. As the countries 
that do not report information on all three variables tend to be concentrated in specific 
regions, we employ a regional dummy variable as one of our dependent variables. In 
addition the GDP in each country is also used as an indicator for response. Countries 
with lower GDPs are less likely to carry out surveys and thus to report any such 
information. In addition we expect that democratic countries are more likely to report 
these values and therefore include the democracy index of the economic intelligence 
unit. We therefore run the regression: 
 =  +	 ! + "#$%	 + &$' ()(*	 
and in the case of agriculture we run 
 =  +	 ! + "#$%		 
In the domestic sector, we estimate the probability that in information on the minimum 
wage is available by running the regression 
 =  +	 ! + "#$%		 
 Once the probabilities of response are calculated we are able to estimate the 
profits made by the use of forced labour per sector per region.  
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Variable Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction Domestic 
Region      
  Developed     
  Economies 
and EU 
0.9888*** 
(0.3155) 
0.4740 
(0.4289) 
0.3889 
(0.4188) 
0.5326 
(0.4488) 
-0.1191 
(0.2907) 
 
  Latin 
America and 
  the 
Caribbean 
1.1318*** 
(0.3152) 
0.4138 
(0.3748) 
0.5093 
(0.3571) 
0.1831 
(0.4049) 
0.2079 
(0.3146) 
 
  Asia-Pacific 0.1956 
(0.2895) 
0.5104 
(0.3541) 
0.6241* 
(0.3373) 
0.5191 
(0.3694) 
-0.2108 
(0.2976) 
 
  Middle East  -0.3179 
(0.3959) 
 
– – – – 
GDP 0.3090 
(0.2508) 
0.2576 
(0.1745) 
0.2396 
(0.1715) 
0.4708** 
(0.2124) 
0.0752 
(0.1362) 
 
Democracy – 0.0901 
(0.0820) 
0.0989 
(0.0791) 
0.0835 
(0.0866) 
 
– 
Constant -0.3090 
(0.1528) 
-1.7066*** 
(0.4188) 
-1.6067*** 
(0.3967) 
-1.7618*** 
(0.4361) 
0.7295*** 
(0.1430) 
R2 0.1366 0.1123 0.1074 0.1584 0.0087 
Number of 
obs. 
174 164 164 164 174 
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